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I. Introduction
Following World War II, the German philosopher Martin Heidegger offered one of the most potent criticisms of technology and modern life. His nightmare is a world whose essence has been reduced to the functional equivalent of "a giant gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry. This relation of man to the world [is] in principle a technical one . . . . [It is] altogether alien to former ages and histories." 2 For Heidegger, the problem is not article is that Heidegger provides an escape, not only for libraries threatened by obsolescence by emerging technologies, but for the law itself, which is under the same risks of subjugation. This essay explains the nature of Heidegger's criticisms of technology and modern life and explores the threat specifically identified by such criticism, including an illustration based upon systematic revision of law in Nazi Germany. The paper applies Heidegger's criticisms to the current legal information environment and contrasts developing technologies and current attitudes and practices with earlier Anglo-American traditions. Finally, the paper will consider the implications for law librarianship in the current information environment.
Similar concerns are manifest with respect to information technologies, where the primary problem is not lack of access, but too much access--for with Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp., 203 F.3d 596 (9th Cir. 2000) (reverse-engineering was permitted under fair use when no end-user license agreement restrictions banning the practice were an issue in the case). 20 See, e.g., U.S. Kilton and Hueting's presentation, no one had looked seriously at the law school.
Motivated by the lecture and with some effort, I was able to identify over seventy his decision to be more true to the "inner truth and greatness" of the movement that the party every could be. As I made my way through some of the legal materials, I was struck by the fact that the Nazis did not simply ignore law; rather, they systematically rewrote it to their own purposes. For example, consider the following translation of a Nazi business organizations statute:
The industrial concern of a legal person is considered as Jewish, The section then goes on to address issues of subsidiaries and mining enterprises. 33 Having been a tax attorney in a former life, I am struck by the technical precision and lengths to which Nazi draftsmen went to define "Jewish" business entities. Technical definitions of "controlled groups" and "closely held"
corporations illustrate similar precision in draftsmanship with respect to U.S. tax law, but without the anti-Semitism. 34 The Nazis, at least in 1934, did not simply ignore the law; they reworked it with great care and precision to their own ends.
A Nazi legal academy, complete with law professors, some of whom sported Nazi pins or armbands, systematically set about to rewrite the law In other words, the law was too important a tool to be entrusted to politicians.
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Both law and legal academia were put to the service of the Nazi "machine."
36 Throughout this article, I use "instrumental" in the same sense as Heidegger uses "technical" or "calculative" to refer the reduction of law and legal information to "resources" to be ordered to some end. See supra notes 4-8 and accompanying text. 37 Hans Frank, Vorwort, in AKADEMIE FÜR DEUTSCHES RECHT, JAHRBUCH 1933/34, at 5-6 (passage translated by this author). 38 See id. ("Here, in the past, the former state's anonymous playground accounted only to extracted economic and political power groups.").
As Führer, Hitler was exalted to the status of a legal concept. In 1940, J.
Walter Jones (Fellow of Queen's College at Oxford) described the Führer as one of two principles upon which the Nazi conception of law was based (the other principle being racial homogeneity). 39 Having reviewed Nazi writings on the subject, Jones observes:
The efficiency of all political and legal machinery is judged by the smoothness and speed which it brings to the functioning of the Nation The point of this painful odyssey through Nazi law is to illustrate the extremes to which law can be reduced to serve some end and be subjugated to a single will. In the words of Dr. Hans Frank, "the Academy for German Law in almost all important fields of law has supplied an abundance of valuable suggestions and contributions for the realization of the National Socialist legal will."
46 It is to the realization of will that law, when reduced to the status of a technological tool as a result of calculative thinking, ultimately succumbs.
C. The Modern American Version-Law and the Billable Unit
In contemporary America, the technological yoking of law to will-its whole scale conversion to "standing reserve"-is infinitely less inimical and perceptible than in Nazi Germany, but the danger is there, nonetheless. It is the subtle shift in attitudes that accompanying new legal technologies to which law librarians, and ultimately the legal profession, must direct their attention.
While describing an experimental system that seamlessly combines brief writing on the word processor with legal research-to facilitate a kind of self- [T]he reason that my colleague was so proud of this is that it reflected his rather cynical attitude about the law itself. There is no sense in which the law informs you at all. You are creating the law that was necessary to your purposes on the fly and you were never going to discover that law wasn't the way you wanted it to be. This [is], you know, the legal realist mentality: There is plenty of law out there for everyone.
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The triumph of legal realism is facilitated by the information environment.
Indeed, Grant C. Gilmore made the argument back in 1961 that realism is a reaction of the information environment to the presence of too many cases in the system.
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Even in the Anglo-American tradition, the same society that triumphed over Nazism and Fascism, the prevailing viewpoint is technological and calculative. Heidegger's fears are apt criticism of American capitalism as well as totalitarian ideologies: "'Calculation' stands for Americanism, 'planning' for communism, and 'cultivation' for National Socialism." 51 The labels may differ but the methods of Western ideologies all share calculative thinking at their core. The common theme from the vendor literature is simple: legal information resources are essential tools, which make the practice of law more efficient.
They even proffer competitive advantage and a sense of security. Furthermore, these information resources put the law at the users "finger tips" so that nothing is missed, or in Heidegger's terms, the resources bring law into the order of information having been established; it is now a proper "resource." Being dedicated to "reducing uncertainty," information bears remarkable relationship to order, or ordering, and fit easily with Heidegger's concept of "standing reserve."
The same is true of law. As discussed previously, legal information reduces uncertainty through providing access to a stable system of rules for resolving disputes in a predictable way. 75 In short, law is the tool, perhaps the principle one, for ordering our world. It is no surprise that the law is often made up of "ord-inance" (deriving from order). 76 Indeed, the German gesetz, translated as law, also means "to place" as in "to set down order." 77 Returning to legal information, the major legal publishers facilitate this ordering in remarkable way, with "Exhibit A" being West's Topic and Key Number system. The quote is not a testimonial about the ease and usefulness of the book, or its utility as a "resource"; rather, it emphasizes the journey which the reader must undertake, and the transformation that is the ultimate reward of the book.
Professor Frederick Hicks, whose legacy as a legal bibliographer and teacher is dear to this profession, recognized the difficulty readers had with Rutledge wrote a telling letter to his brother Edward, who was then studying law in England. The letter advises:
[W]ith regard to particular law books-Coke's Institutes seem to be almost the foundation of our law. These you must read over and over, with the greatest attention, and not quit him till you understand him thoroughly, and have made your own everything in him, which is worth taking out. J. 1124, 1127 (1936-1937 Besides the pragmatic recognition that many libraries serve more virtual visitors than physical patrons, the library must serve as a window to a wider world; allowing patrons to access unfamiliar places and ideas.
Library as Social Knowledge Networks
An organization's principle value is not its physical assets, but what the organization "knows"-including both the information it accesses and stores and the collective knowledge, wisdom, and social relationships of the organization's members-in this case the knowledge, skill, and relationships of the librarians.
Library as User Behavior and Character
The transformative impact of a library on its users and constituents is a prime justification for its continued existence. Not only should research skills and information literacy drive much of a library's effort, but the library's impact on the overall character and education of its users must be emphasized. Consequently, it will never do for law libraries to simply "train" students in legal research skills.
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Library as Transformative and Communal Place As addressed in the Salzburg Statement, the law library provides sanctuary for human thought and expression and serves an important role in defining the respective cultures of the law schools and legal profession. It is a temple to which patrons may withdraw from the world, if only for a brief moment, to reorient their moral compasses, reflect on their ideals, remember who they
